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Williams: Humphrey v. Lane

HUMPHREY V . LANE1 : THE O HIO CONSTITUTION’S DAVID SLAYS THE GOLIATH OF
EMPLOYMENT DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES OF OREGON V . SMITH2
Give me liberty, or give me Smith. 3

I. INTRODUCTION
Wendall Humphrey, a practicing Native American Indian, wore his hair long. 4 His
employer told him to cut his hair or be fired. 5 Humphrey did not wear his hair long as an act of
rebellion. 6 Humphrey wore his hair long for only one reason, to exercise his religious beliefs. 7
The story of Wendall Humphrey is a modern-day version of the biblical narrative of
David and Goliath. 8 Humphrey represents citizens whose rights to the free exercise of religion

1

Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2000) (holding, six-to-one, that the Ohio Constitution’s Free Exercise
Clause affords a broader protection than is provided by the United States Constitution, and that strict scrutiny is the
standard of review for religious free exercise cases in Ohio, rather than the generally applicable, religion-neutral
standard in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
2

Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

3

Patrick Henry, Speech at the Virginia House of Delegates, Richmond, (Mar. 23, 1775) quoted in JOHN BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 270 (1937). The full text of the original quote reads, “I know not what course others may
take; but as for me, give me liberty or give me death.” Id. The author takes poetic license with the statement made
by Patrick Henry prior to the American Revolution. This illustrates the view that the abandonment in Smith of the
strict scrutiny analysis for free exercise cases was an ending of sorts to what Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in
Smith, referred to as “a settled and inviolate principle of this Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.” Smith, 494
U.S. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
4

Alan Johnson, A Fight for His Heritage: Long Hair at Center of Court Case, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, April 10,
2000, at A-1. In the interview, Humphrey stated further that “[n]ative people believe the Creator knows you by your
hair. . . . When I braid my hair, each braid is a prayer.” Id.
5

Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1041.

6

Humphrey’s beliefs included the idea that a man’s hair would be cut only on special occasions, s uch as at times of
mourning. Id.
7

In Humphrey, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that the trial court made express findings that Humphrey’s beliefs
were sincerely held. Id. at 1045. Humphrey’s practice of allowing his hair to grow long is consistent with those
who walk “the red road” in the practice of Native American spirituality as a Shoshone-Bannock Tribe member. Id.
8

1 Samuel 17. The story of David and Goliath in the Bible describes the young Hebrew David, later to become
King of Israel, who slays an apparently overpowering opponent in Goliath. According to THE A BINGTON BIBLE
COMMENTARY, the nuance of the story is that David is not so much concerned with a victory in battle, but rather
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will remain protected under the Ohio Constitution, even though they are threatened by narrow
federal interpretations of religious free exercise. 9 In Humphrey, 10 the Ohio Supreme Court left
the battlefield of religious freedom, having successfully defended the right of religious free
exercise under the authority of the Ohio Constitution. 11
This Note explores the renewed relevance and power of the Ohio Constitution’s free
exercise language in combating the weakened protection afforded an individual’s free exercise of
religion under current federal analysis. 12 The Goliath of the Smith analysis 13 is slain by the
David of the Humphrey analysis, 14 which is rooted in the Ohio Constitution.

David’s concern throughout is for defending the honor of his God. THE A BINGTON BIBLE COMMENTARY 392
(Fredrick Carl Eiselen et al. eds., 1st ed. 1929).
9

Alan Johnson, Corrections Officer May Keep Long Hair, COLUMBUS DISPATCH , May 25, 2000, at D-1. Kathleen
Trafford, Humphrey’s attorney, stated in an interview after the decision in Humphrey was announced, that they
“were hopeful the Ohio Supreme Court, given their long history of broadly upholding religious freedom in Ohio,
was the place to be . . . . I think this is an important decision, not only in Ohio but across the country.” Id. Upon
hearing the decision, Humphrey remarked, “I think I changed a little history here.” Id.
10

Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1043-44 (Ohio 2000) (declaring that the decision is based solely on the
Ohio Constitution).
11

See infra Part II.B.1.

12

Justice Pfeifer, writing for the majority in Humphrey, stated that:
It was the Smith decision that marked the divergence of federal and Ohio protection of religious
freedom. Not until Smith did the difference in the constitutional clauses become relevant . . . .
[T]he Ohio Constitution’s free exercise protection is broader, and we therefore vary from the
federal test for religiously neutral, evenly applied governmental actions. We apply a different
standard to a different constitutional protection.
Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1044-45.
13

Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-85 (1990) (holding that
religion-neutral, generally applicable laws would not be found to violate the Free Exercise Clause).
14

Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1043-45 (affirming that the Ohio Constitution requires a strict scrutiny analysis, as
preserved through existing precedent in Ohio law).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon, v. Smith15 and its
Aftermath: The Stage is Set for Humphrey16
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court, in its decision in Smith, 17 made what many
considered to be a radical shift away from the country’s historic accommodation of the free
exercise of religion. 18 Dissenting from the majority, Justice Blackmun wrote:
[T]his Court over the years painstakingly has developed a consistent and exacting
standard to test the constitutionality of a state statute that burdens the free exercise of
religion . . . . Until today, I thought this was a settled and inviolate principle of this
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. The majority, however, perfunctorily dismiss it
as a “constitutional anomaly.”19
The painstaking development referred to is found in a line of cases beginning with Sherbert 20
and Yoder, 21 Free Exercise Clause decisions, and Lemon, 22 a controversial Establishment Clause

15

Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

16

Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1044 (explaining that it was “the Smith decision that marked the divergence of federal
and Ohio protection of religious freedom”).
17

Smith, 494 U.S. at 886. Smith characterized a broad interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause right as a “private
right to ignore generally applicable laws.” Id. at 886-87. The decision further characterized that a broad free
exercise right would be “courting anarchy.” Id. at 888. But see id. at 891 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment
only) (stating that the majority’s holding “dramatically departs from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence,
appears unnecessary to resolve the question presented, and is incompatible with our Nation’s fundamental
commitment to individual religious liberty”).
18

Honorable Arlin M. Adams, Perspectives: Religion and the Law: Recent Decisions by the United States Supreme
Court Concerning the Jurisprudence of Religious Freedom, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1581 (1994). In reviewing recent
U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Judge Adams found that:
religious faith is that thing most trivialized and shoved aside in the public arena, treated like an
embarrassing tick or even a character failing, particularly when religious people seek to couple their beliefs
with vision of America . . . . Thus, a growing number of thoughtful citizens are beginning to realize what
the Framers apparently understood, namely, that religion plays an invaluable part in American society.
Id. at 1598.
19

Smith, 494 U.S. at 907-08.

20

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Mrs. Adele Sherbert, a devout Seventh-day Adventist, who observed
her Sabbath on Saturdays, was denied unemployment compensation by South Carolina because she declined to work
on Saturdays. Id. at 399-400. Holding that Sherbert had a right to the benefits, the Court stated that:
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decision in 1971. After Smith,23 this Free Exercise Clause line of authority appeared to have
been abandoned, and the decision drew criticism from Justices Souter and O’Connor in later
decisions. 24
Congress attempted to get around the decisio n in Smith when it enacted the Restoration
Freedom of Religion Act of 1993 (RFRA), 25 which was overturned by the United States

[t]he ruling forces her to choose between following precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits . . .
[g]overnmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion
as would a fine imposed against [her] for her Saturday worship.
Id. at 404.
21

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Yoders were parents who were members of the Old Order Amish
religion and the Amish Mennonite Church. Id. at 207. They were convicted of violating Wisconsin’s compulsory
school attendance law because they declined to send their children to school after eighth grade. Id. at 207-08. The
Court held that the state’s interest in education was not “totally free from a balancing process when [the state statute]
impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment . . . . ” Id. at 214.
22

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that payment of salary supplements by the state to public
school teachers who taught secular topics in religious schools was in violation of the Establishment Clause because
the salary supplement statute required state officials to become involved with religious school procedures and
oversight). While Humphrey involves a free exercise claim, Lemon dealt with an Establishment Clause claim. Id.
In Lemon, the U.S. Supreme Court established a three-prong test to determine whether there is a violation of the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 612-13.
A statute does not violate the Establishment Clause if: 1) the statute has a secular legislative purpose; 2)
the statute’s primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion; and 3) the statute does note excessively entangle
government with religion. Id. Lemon, like Smith, has been criticized by various Justices in recent opinions. See,
e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-99 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Allegheny County v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 655-57 (1989) (White, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); Westside Community Schools Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 258
(1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.3, n.1, at 1223 (5th ed.
1995).
23

Smith, 494 U.S. at 890-907 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment only). Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion
is an eloquent recital of the history of U.S. Supreme Court free exercise decisions and their importance. Id.
24

The criticism of Smith was evident in post-Smith opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, in Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 559 (1993), Justice Souter stated that he had “doubts
about whether the Smith rule merits adherence.” Id. Souter continued, observing that “we are left with a freeexercise jurisprudence in tension with itself, a tension that should be addressed, by reexamining the Smith rule . . . .”
Id. at 564.
In her dissent in City of Boerne v. Flores, Justice O’Connor declared: “I remain of the view that Smith was
wrongly decided . . . [and] that in light of both our precedent and our Nation’s tradition of religious liberty, Smith is
demonstrably wrong.” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 544-54 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). For a current analysis
of how each individual justice would find on related Establishment Clause issues, see Lisa Langendorfer, Comment,
Establishing a Pattern: An Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 33 U. RICH. L.
REV. 705 (1999).
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Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores. 26 Both Congress and many states have responded
with a vast array of alternative means to protect free exercise rights. 27
B. The Ohio Solution
1. The Independent Force of the Ohio Constitution
Ohio courts may look to interpretations of the federal Constitution when they interpret
the Ohio Constitution, but the United States Supreme Court has determined that states are not
bound to do so. 28 In fact, Ohio’s constitutional religious free exercise right grew out of the

25

See Symposium, James R. Browning Symposium for 1994: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 M ONT . L.
REV. 5, 5 (1995) (describing the RFRA prior to its being overturned). Congress passed RFRA to revive the
compelling-state-interest/ least-restrictive-means analysis for free exercise cases. Id..
26

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 563 (1997). In City of Boerne, local zoning authorities denied Catholic
Archbishop Flores a building permit to enlarge his church because the church was covered by a city ordinance
governing historic preservation. Id. at 511-12. The suit, filed under RFRA, ultimately provided an opportunity for
the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn RFRA as it applied to states, holding that Congress exceeded its authority by
passing such legislation. Id. at 536. See also generally Symposium, Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores, 39
W M. & M ARY L. REV. 597 (1998).
27

Congress responded in 1993 with RFRA, the application of which to the states was voided in the City of Boerne
decision in 1997. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. The Free Exercise Clause may have been an
innocent victim of this line of U.S. Supreme Court cases. Thomas L. DeBusk, RFRA Came, RFRA Went: Where
Does That Leave the First Amendment? A Case Comment on City of Boerne v. Flores, 10 REGENT U. L. REV. 223,
246 (1998). At the state level, many states have enacted their own versions of RFRA. E.g., W. Cole Durham, Jr.,
State RFRAs and the Scope of Free Exercise Protection, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665 (1999); Stanley H.
Freidelbaum, Free Exercise in the States: Belief, Conduct, and Judicial Benchmarks, 63 A LB. L. REV. 1059 (2000).
But see Mary Jean Dolan, The Constitutional Flaws in the New Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Why
RFRAs Don’t Work, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (2000) (noting serious separation-of-powers and Establishment
Clause conflicts with state RFRAs, and analyzing whether legislation could be redrafted to resolve such conflicts).
Cf. Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions – A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 595 (1999) (analyzing the fact that RFRA remains valid at the federal level, observing its possible
unintended consequences in the areas of government employment and property, or government-run schools, and
suggesting an analytical “test suite” to test for alternatives to RFRA).
Federal free exercise protection may still be sought under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). See also
generally Gregory J. Gawlick, The Politics of Religion: ‘Reasonable Accommodations’ and the Establishment
Clause: An Analysis of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act, 47 CLEV. ST . L. RE V. 249 (1999). For a discussion
of related Title VII free exe rcise issues and the potential conflict of laws between state RFRAs and Title VII, see
Vikram David Amar, State RFRAs and the Workplace, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 513 (1999).
28

Two U.S. Supreme Court decisions from the 1980s bolster this observation. See California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35, 43 (1988) (“Individual States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more stringent
constraints . . . than does the Federal Constitution.”); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293
(1982) (“[A] state court is entirely free to read its own State’s Constitution more broadly than this Court reads the
Federal Constitution, or to reject the mode of analysis used by this Court in favor of a different analysis of its
corresponding constitutional guarantee.”).
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language of the Ordinance of 1787, and was not based upon the language of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 29
Prior to Humphrey, the Ohio Supreme Court had already determined that the language of
the Ohio Constitution is of independent force, 30 and that, where the state Constitution’s language
is distinct from the language of the federal Constitution, courts are not bound to read the Ohio
Constitution as co-extensive with the federal Constitution. 31 The Ohio Supreme Court has also
established that the language of the Ohio Constitution provides a broader freedom to exercise
religion than does the language of the United States Constitution. 32 In an analogous 1995

29

The Ordinance of 1787 provided: “No person, demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly manner, shall ever be
molested on account of his mode of worship, or religious sentiments, in the said territory . . . .” Act of Aug. 2 1789,
ch. 8, 1 Stat. 51, 52 (1789). Section Three, Article Eight of the original Ohio Constitution of 1802 stated that: “all
men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of conscience; that no
human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience . . . .” A NSON P.
STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 155 (1964) (describing not only the 1802 Ohio
Constitution’s language, but also the history of religious freedom in the United States, including comparisons of the
varying origins and development of state constitutional language providing for freedom of religious practice).
30

Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 1993). In Arnold, the Ohio Supreme Court held that:
The Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force. In the areas of individual rights and
civil liberties, the United States Constitution, where applicable to the states, provides a floor below
which state courts may not fall. As long as state courts provide at least as much protection as the
Unites States Supreme Court has provided in its interpretation of the federal Bill of Rights, state
courts are unrestricted in according greater civil liberties and protections to individuals and
groups.
Id. at 164 (citing the syllabus).
31

State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997). Robinette involved a review of the search and seizure provisions
of the Ohio and federal Constitutions. Id. The Court found the provisions were co-extensive because the language
of the State and federal protections from search and seizure were “virtually identical.” Id. at 766. For an extended
investigation of this issue and Robinette, see Marianna Brown Bettman, Identical Constitutional Language: What Is
A State Court to Do? The Ohio Case of State v. Robinette, 32 A KRON L. REV. 657 (1999).
The texts at issue in Humphrey, however, are not identical, but the textual issues are analogous to those
dealt with in Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999). Simmons-Harris addressed the issue of school
voucher programs. Id. Analyzing the Ohio Constitution, the Court found that the “language of the Ohio [Religion
Clauses] is quite different from the federal language.” Id. at 212. As a result, the Court held that “[t]here is no
reason to conclude that the Religion Clauses of the Ohio Constitution are coextensive with those in the U.S.
Constitution, though they have at times been discussed in tandem.” Id. at 211-12.
32

Compare U.S. CONST . amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof”), with OHIO CONST . art. 1, § 7 (“All men have a natural and indefeasible right
to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own conscience . . . . Religion, morality, and knowledge,
however, being essential to good government, it shall be the duty of the general assembly to pass suitable laws to
protect every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship . . . . ”). In
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decision involving Ohio’s Free Speech Clause, the Ohio Supreme Court found that the Ohio
language provides greater protection than does the federal Constitution. 33
2. Ohio Free Exercise Precedent
The history of Ohio’s free exercise jurisprudence is simpler than the federal history. 34
Over the past two decades, the Ohio Supreme Court has articulated a religious free exercise line
of authority based upon the language of the Ohio Constitution. 35 In State v. Whisner, 36 the Court
stated:
[Section Seven, Article One] means that a man’s right to his own religious
convictions, and to impart them to his own children, and his and their right to
engage, in conformity thereto, in harmless acts of worship toward the Almighty,
are as sacred in the eye of the law as his rights of person or property, and that
although in the minority, he shall be protected in the full and unrestricted
enjoyment thereof. The “protection” guaranteed by [Section Seven, Article One]
means protection to the minority. The majority can protect itself. Constitutions
are enacted for the very purpose of protecting the weak against the strong; the few
against the many. 37

contrast, the First Amendment states, in regard to freedom of speech, that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging freedom of speech, or of the press,” while the Ohio Constitution’s free speech language states that
“[e]very citizen may speak freely . . . and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the
press.” OHIO CONST . art. I, § 7.
33

Vail v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 649 N.E.2d 182 (Ohio 1995). “The Ohio Constitution provides a separate
and independent guarantee of protection for opinion ancillary to freedom of the press.” Id. at 281.
34

Ohio has not resorted to the vast array of novel statutory devices or constitutional analysis that characterizes the
federal free exercise history. See supra notes 17-27 and cases cited therein.
35

The three primary cases relevant to Humphrey are: State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio 1976) (holding
invalid state compulsory school attendance laws applied to children attending religious non-public schools); In re
Milton, 505 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio 1987) (affirming an individual’s right to refuse medical treatment for religious
reasons); and Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999) (dealing with school vouchers and analyzing
religious claims under the Oh io Constitution that are significant to construing free exercise claims under the federal
Constitution).
36

Whisner, 351 N.E.2d at 766-67.

37

Id. at 766 (quoting Board of Ed. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 249-51 (1872)).
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Following Whisner, 38 the Court found, in In re Milton,39 that the claimant, an adult
woman, had a right to choose faith healing over medical treatment that was in conflict with her
religious beliefs. 40 The Court cited Section Seven, Article One of the Ohio Constitution and held
that such a right to choose existed and would be upheld. 41
The most recent Ohio Supreme Court decision to impact freedom of religion rights prior
to Humphrey was in 1999 in Simmons-Harris v. Goff.42 To bolster the continuity of the Court’s
line of authority in freedom of religion issues, the Court stated in Simmons-Harris:
There is no reason to conclude that the Religion Clauses of the Ohio
Constitution are coextensive with those in the United States Constitution, though
they have at times been discussed in tandem. The language of the Ohio
provisions is quite different from the federal language . . . . We reserve the right
to adopt a different constitutional standard pursuant to the Ohio Constitution,
whether because the federal constitutional standard changes or for any other
relevant reason. 43
The stage was set for the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Humphrey. 44
38

State v. Whisner, 351 N.E. 750 (Ohio 1976).

39

Milton, 505 N.E.2d at 257 (upholding the right of a competent adult to make a religiously motivated choice of
faith healing over forced medical treatment).
40

The Milton court rejected the finding by the appellate court that appellant’s belief in faith healing constituted a
delusion. Id. at 258. The Court instead found that:
[t]here is a dichotomy between modern medicine . . . and religion which is . . . a matter of individual faith .
. . . Absent the most exigent circumstances, courts s hould never be a party to branding a citizen’s religious
views as baseless on the grounds that they are non-traditional, unorthodox or at war with what the state or
others perceive.
Id. at 258-60.
41

The Milton holding is an example of the convergence of the protection afforded free exercise of religion under
both the Ohio Constitution and the federal constitution. Id. at 258. In Humphrey, the Court noted that, because of
the change of direction in Smith, there was no longer a convergence, but rather a divergence, of state and federal free
exercise jurisprudence. Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1044 (Ohio 2000).
42

Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999) (upholding the constitutionality of school voucher
program, stating that the program in general did not violate the Establishment Clause, and affirming the independent
authority of the Ohio Constitution).
43

Id. at 211-12.

44

Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2000).
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of Facts
Wendall Humphrey began his employment with the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation
and Correction (ODRC), 45 at the Hocking Correctional Facility (HCF), 46 in 1988. 47 Prior to his
employment, Humphrey discovered his heritage as a member of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe,
but had not yet begun the active practice of his Native American spirituality. 48 At the time of his
initial employment, Humphrey wore his hair short. 49 Two years later, in 1990, Humphrey began
to practice Native American spirituality, and began to wear his hair long in conformity with his
religious beliefs. 50 The ODRC implemented a Grooming Policy in 1992. 51 Through the Ohio

45

The ODRC is established in, and its responsibilities are defined by, Ohio statute. OHIO REV. CODE A NN. § 5120
(West 2000). The ODRC is administered by a director whom the Governor appoints. Id. § 5120.01. The Director is
the Chief Administrator of ODRC, and has full power and authority to supervise and control the ODRC’s affairs.
Id. The ODRC maintains 34 prisons, in addition to providing parole and community services. ODRC Mission and
Organization (visited Jan. 30, 2001) <http://www.drc.state.oh.us/web/whoweare.htm>.
46

Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1041.

47

ODRC Hocking Correctional Facility (visited Jan. 30, 2001) <http://www.drc.state.oh.
us/public/hcf.htm>. HCF is located near Nelsonville, Ohio. Id. HCF is a minimum/medium-security prison that
houses the state’s oldest inmates. Id. HCF was opened in 1983, and is designed to provide a safe and secure
environment for its aging population of about 400 inmates. Id. HCF’s total number of staff is 161, of which 87 are
security staff. Id. Inmates do not perform industrial labor, but rather perform a wide variety of community service
projects, such as hiking trail maintenance and painting projects for local churches and schools. Id.
48

The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes Tribal History (visited Jan. 30, 2001) <http://www.sho-ban.com/history/asp>. The
Shoshone and Bannock Indians live on the 544,000-acre Fort Hall Indian Reservation. Id. The Shoshone-Bannock
originally roamed the areas of what is now Wyoming, Utah, Nevada, and Idaho. Id. When Lewis and Clark
explored the West, they were led by a Shoshone woman named Sacajawea. Id. A Presidential Executive Order
established the current reservation at Fort Hall in 1867. Id. The Tribes on the Fort Hall Reservation are organized
under a sovereign government. Id. The Shoshone-Bannock are engaged in agriculture, tourism, and other business
enterprises. Id. The Fort Hall reservation is located about 100 miles west of Yellowstone National Park, and 200
miles north of Salt Lake City, Utah. The Shoshone Bannock Tribes Tribal History (visited Jan. 30, 2001)
<http://www.sho-ban.com/history/htm>.
49

Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1041.

50

Alan Johnson, A Fight for His Heritage: Long Hair at Center Court Case, COLUMBUS DISPATCH , Apr. 10, 2000,
at A-1. Wendall Humphrey was born on April 26, 1952, on the Shoshone-Bannock Indian reservation, at Fort Hill,
Idaho. Id. As a boy, he lived with his father, Shoshone Wheeler, who was killed in and hit-and-run accident; his
mother, Serena Edmo Wheeler, succumbed to problems with alcohol and lost her children when Humphrey was five.
Id. Humphrey was adopted by Thomas and Ann Humphrey, and grew up with them in Vacaville, California, near
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Civil Rights Commission, Humphrey and the ODRC reached an agreement to accommodate
Humphrey’s beliefs despite the Policy; this accommodation continued without incident for seven
years. 52 However, in January of 1997, Warden Lane attempted to force Humphrey to conform to
the Grooming Policy, and initiated disciplinary hearings against Humphrey for not cutting his
hair. 53
B. Procedural History
On May 28, 1997, Humphrey filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief, as well as a motion for a preliminary injunction against ODRC, in the Hocking County

Travis Air Force Base. Id. Humphrey did not know about his Native American heritage until he was 29 years old.
Id. Humphrey and his wife, Cathy, flew to Idaho for a reunion with his family. Id. Humphrey discovered that his
great-great-grandfather, Arimo, had been a Shoshone-Bannock chief. Id. Within a few years, Humphrey began to
walk “the red road,” the sincere practice of Native American spirituality. Alan Johnson, A Fight for His Heritage:
Long Hair at Center Court Case, COLUMBUS DISPATCH , April 10, 2000, at A-1. Humphrey’s earnest practice of his
Native American religious beliefs began early in his employment history with ODRC. Id.
51

The Grooming Policy, ODRC Policy 401-06, was issued in compliance with Section 5120.01 of the Ohio Revised
Code. Under Section 5120.01, the authority to establish departmental policies is delegated to the Director of ODRC.
OHIO REV. CODE A NN. § 5120.01 (West 2000). The Director is empowered to manage all divisions and institutions
of the ODRC and to establish such rules and regulations as he prescribes. Id. The relevant section of the Grooming
Policy states:
V. Procedures:
A. Uniformed Personnel
....
2. Hairstyle shall not interfere with the wearing or proper positioning of the uniform cap. Hair
shall be styled above the eyebrow in the front. Certain hairstyles may be considered
incompatible with a professional and dignified appearance.
ODRC EMPLOYEE GROOMING POLICY, § V.A.2. Although this is the language of the current policy, it does not
differ materially from the grooming policy that was in place in 1992. Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1041.
52

Humphrey simply pinned his hair under his cap. Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1042.

53

Blanken v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 944 F. Supp. 1359, 1359 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (holding that the ODRC
Grooming Policy did not violate the free exercise protection in regard to the particular plaintiff, a cafeteria worker
who wore an extreme and highly visible hair style). Warden Lane issued a memorandum based on the Blanken
decision, demanding that employees conform to the Grooming Policy. Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1042. Humphrey
sought further accommodation based on his religious practice. Id. As a result, Humphrey was subjected to
disciplinary hearings and threatened with termination. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court ultimately held that Blanken
was distinguishable from Humphrey’s situation because the plaintiff in Blanken exhibited an extreme hair style that
could not be concealed during work hours; in contrast, Humphrey’s long hair was pinned under his cap at all times,
and therefore was concealed. Id. at 1046.
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Court of Common Pleas. 54 The trial court ruled in Humphrey’s favor, basing its decision upon
established Ohio precedent. 55
ODRC appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District reversed the trial
court. 56 The Court of Appeals found that the religion-neutral/generally applicable analysis in
Smith57 applied. 58 The Court of Appeals further predicted that, if this case were to go before the
Ohio Supreme Court, the high court would revisit its prior decisions and would harmonize Ohio
law with the reasoning in Smith.59
C. The Ohio Supreme Court Decision
The Ohio Supreme Court heard the case on discretionary appeal60 and, on May 24, 2000,
resolved the split between the trial court and the appellate court by relying on the unique
54

Id. at 1042. A hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction was held on June 6, 1997, and the motion was
granted on June 11, 1997. Id. On August 28, 1997, a bench trial was held on the merits. Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at
1042. The decision was rendered, and the permanent injunction was granted to Humphrey on February 6, 1998.
Humphrey v. Lane, No. 97 CIV 182 (Hocking County C.P. Feb. 6, 1998), rev’d, No. 98CA 4, 1998 WL 880592
(Oh. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1998), aff’d, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2000).
55

The trial court looked at the constitutional analysis for free exercise cla ims established by earlier decisions of the
Ohio Supreme Court in In re Milton, 505 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio 1987), and in State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio
1976). Id. Those decisions employed a strict scrutiny analysis, whereby the state must show, after determining that
the individual’s religious beliefs were sincerely held, that the state had a compelling interest, and that where free
exercise was infringed, the state interest was furthered by the least restrictive means available. Id. The trial court
found that requiring Humphrey to cut his hair was not the least restrictive means, and that pinning his hair under his
cap met the aims of the Grooming Policy. Id.
56

Humphrey v. Lane, No. 98 CA 4, 1998 WL 880592 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1998), rev’d 728 N.E. 2d 1039 (Ohio
2000). The Court of Appeals differed in approach to the issue from the trial court, and found that the trial court had
applied the wrong standard of review. Id. at *6. The appellate court held that the correct standard was to be found
in the Smith analysis, under which the ODRC did not need to show a compelling state interest, as long as the
regulation was religion-neutral and was generally applicable. Id. at *9. Further, the appellate court found that,
while states may rely on their own constitutional language, Ohio’s Constitution should be read not as independent
from, but rather as co-extensive with, federal law. Id. at *7.
57

Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-90 (1990).

58

Humphrey, 1998 WL 880592, at *6, *10-*13.

59

The Court of Appeals stated that it “believe[d] that the Ohio Supreme Court, if confronted with the issue, would
revisit its [Milton and Whisner holdings] to bring them into compliance with [Smith].” Id. at *8.
60

Humphrey v. Lane, 708 N.E.2d 1012 (Ohio 1999) (granting certiorari).
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language of the Ohio Constitution, 61 and on the established Ohio jurisprudence in free exercise
cases. 62 The six-to-one majority in Humphrey determined that strict scrutiny is the appropriate
standard of review when the free exercise of religion was at issue. 63 A single justice chose to
dissent, concerned that not following Smith 64 and maintaining a pre-Smith analysis, “would be
courting anarchy.”65
IV. ANALYSIS
I think I changed a little history here. 66
A. Resolving the Clashes 67
In Humphrey, the Ohio Supreme Court resolved several clashes between disparate
interests. 68 The most fundamental clash resolved was that between the Ohio Constitution and the

61

In its opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court made its first priority an analysis of the difference between the language of
the Ohio Constitution and that of the federal Constitution. Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1043-44 (Ohio
2000).
62

See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.

63

Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1043 (Ohio 2000).

64

Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).

65

Justice Cook, dissenting, presented an argument for following Smith. Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1048 (Cook, J.,
dissenting). One of the Justice’s concerns was that following the pre-Smith analysis would encourage an
unacceptable number of claims by individuals who wanti to be free of the need to obey generally applicable laws,
and thereby, in the words of Smith, would court “anarchy.” Id. at 1048 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 888).
66

Johnson, supra note 9 (quoting Wendall Humphrey).

67

The Ohio Supreme Court characterized the precipitating event of the case as a clash between Humphrey’s
sincerely held religious beliefs and the grooming policy of the ODRC. Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1041. “Clash” is a
strong term that connotes a sharp, usually jarring or unpleasant contras t. W EBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT ’L
DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 416 (1986).
68

Various clashes, apart from the first clash between Humphrey’s religious beliefs and the Grooming Policy, can be
identified throughout the opinion. Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1041-49. Second, there is the clash between the
reasoning of the trial court and that of the appellate court. Id. at 1042-43. Third, the Court analyzed the clash
between the Ohio Constitution and the federal Constitution. Id. at 1043-44. Fourth, the Court identified a clash
between the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Smith and past Ohio Supreme Court free exercise decisions. Id. at
1044-45. Fifth, the opinion addressed the clash between the strict scrutiny Ohio analysis, and the religion-neutral/
generally-applicable legal analysis of federal free exercise claims. Id. at 1044-45. Sixth, the Court resolved varying
views of that standards that apply to prison employees in regard to image. Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d. at 1045-46.
Seventh, the Court distinguished the case at issue from the federal case of Blanken v. Ohio Department of
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federal Constitution. 69 Second only to the constitutional conflict was the clash between the two
standards of review for free exercise claims. 70 The Ohio Supreme Court resolved that clash by
determining that the strict scrutiny test, based upon the Ohio Constitution and Ohio precedent,
would control over the religion-neutral/generally-applicable standard that the United States
Supreme Court announced in Smith. 71
1. The Clash Between the Ohio and Federal Constitutions
With simplicity and dignity, 72 the majority based its analysis on the cornerstone of a
state’s governing power, the state Constitution. 73 The language of the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution74 and Section Seven, Article One of the Ohio Constitution differ

Rehabilitation & Correction, 944 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D. Ohio 1996), which caused HCF Warden Lane to pursue
disciplinary action against Humphrey. Id. at 1046. Eighth, there is the clash between the majority reasoning and the
dissent, wherein the dissent addresses many of the points at issue in the various clashes identified. Id. at 1047-49.
69

Id. at 1043-44. The Court found the constitutional issue so compelling that it began both the Court-written
syllabus and the main opinion with definitive statements citing the authority of the Ohio Constitution. Id.
70

Id. at 1044-45.

71

Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).

72

Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1039. The majority disposed of this case in a seven-page opinion, relying succinctly on
only seven cases, in addition to citing the Free Exercise Clauses of both the Ohio and United States Constitutions.
Id. The trial court, with which the majority largely agreed, produced a four-page opinion, citing only four cases, in
addition to the Ohio Constitution, and a reference to RFRA. Humphrey v. Lane, No. 97 CIV 182 (Hocking County
C.P. Feb. 6, 1998). The appellate court, however, yielded a 17-page judgment covering 50 case citations, in addition
to references to statutory materials and the relevant constitutions. Humphrey v. Lane, No. 98 CA 4, 1998 WL
880592 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. Dec. 14, 1998). The Ohio Supreme Court, in its final decision in Humphrey,
commenting on the constitutional language at issue, stated that “we are not doing a mere word count, but instead are
looking for a qualitative difference.” Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1044 (Ohio 2000).
73

16 A M. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 9 (1998) (“Under the American system, each state was left free to establish a
constitution for itself, and in that constitution to provide such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its
particular government as its judgment might dictate.”).
74

John Witte, Jr., Oracle of Religious Liberty, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 327 (1999) (reviewing JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE
LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY : THE A MERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1998)). The book review
highlights several observations of the author about the role of the federal Constitution in providing for religious
freedom throughout the history of the United States. Id. Specifically, the author draws an analogy between modern
day high technology and the Constitution, when he observes that the “Constitution is a semiconductor between
religion and government . . . . A semiconductor, like silicon, passes on small, controlled amounts of electricity
which enables you to have exactly was much as you need . . . . Free Exercise [is] the silicon of our society.” Id. at
331.
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significantly. 75 The federal Free Exercise Clause opens with a limitation on federal power,
stating that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof . . . .”76 In contrast, the Ohio Constitution’s Religion Clause opens by
describing a right:
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according
to the dictates of their own conscience. No person shall be compelled to attend,
erect, or support any place of worship, or maintain any form of worship, against
his consent; and no preference shall be given by law, to any religious socie ty; nor
shall any interference with the rights of conscience be permitted. 77

The Ohio Supreme Court accorded due deference to the Free Exercise Clause of the
federal Constitution, noting that “[t]he one phrase in the United States Constitution regarding the
freedom of religion is one of the most powerful statements in human history.”78 As the Court

75

The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Ohio Constitution “does have an eleven word phrase that distinguishes
itself from the United States Constitution.” Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1044. That phrase, “nor shall any interference
with the rights of conscience be permitted,” was read by the Court as providing a total “ban on any interference
[with religious free exercise, and] makes even . . . tangential effects [on religious free exercise] potentially
unconstitutional.” Id.
76

U.S. CONST . amend. I (emphasis added). The full text reads:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
Id.
77

OHIO CONST . art. 1, § 7 (emphasis added). The full text reads:
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates
of their own conscience. No person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of
worship, or maintain any place of worship, against his consent; and no preference shall be given,
by law, to any religious society; nor shall any interference with the rights of conscience be
permitted. No religious test shall be required, as a qualification for office, nor shall any person be
incompetent to be a witness on account of his religious belief; but nothing hereinshall be construed
to dispense with oaths or affirmations. Religion, morality, and knowledge, however, begin
essential to good government, it shall be the duty of the general assembly to pass suitable laws to
protect every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public
worship, and to encourage schools and the means of instruction.
Id.
78

Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1043. It is notable that the Ohio Supreme Court did not refer to the federal Constitution
in the syllabus, which, in Ohio, is written by the Court and carries the force of law. Id. at 1039. The opening
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compared that utterance with Ohio’s Constitution, it found that, while Ohio’s more specific
description was not prima facie proof of a broader freedom, the words of the Ohio Framers
indicated their intent to make an independent statement on the meaning and extent of religious
freedom in Ohio. 79
The Ohio Supreme Court established that the Ohio Constitution is a document of
independent force in Arnold v. Cleveland.80 In Arnold, 81 the Court held that the federal

paragraph of the opinion makes clear that this Court intended to rest its analysis in Humphrey on the Ohio
Constitution as possessing independent authority:
We hold that under Section 7, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, the standard for reviewing a
generally applicable, religion-neutral state regulation that allegedly violates a person’s right to free
exercise of religion is whether the regulation serves a compelling state interest and is the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest.
Id. at 1043.
79

The Ohio Supreme Court was looking at not only the differing lengths of the Ohio and federal religion clauses – a
“mere word count” – but also a qualitative difference in the words of the Framers of the Ohio Constitution. Id. at
1043-44. Several other States have similarly specific language their constitutions’ religion clauses. See, e.g., CAL.
CONST . art. I, § 4 (unequivocally stating that “[f]ree exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or
preference are guaranteed.); M E. CONST . art. I, § 3 (stating that “[a]ll individuals have a natural and unalienable
right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences, and no person shall be hurt,
molested or restrained in that person’s liberty or estate for worshipping God in the manner and season most
agreeable to the dictates of that person’s own conscience . . . .”); M ASS. CONST . pt. I, art. II (providing that no
“subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping GOD in the manner
and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience, or for his religious profession or sentiments . . . .”);
M INN. CONST . art. I, § 16 (stating that the “right of every man to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience shall never be infringed . . . .”); N.J. CONST . preamble (stating a source of power prior to the state by
announcing that “We, the people of the State of New Jersey, grateful to Almighty God for the civil and religious
liberty which He hath so long permitted us to enjoy, and looking to Him for a blessing upon our endeavors to secure
and transmit the same unimpaired to succeeding generations, do ordain and establish this Constitution.”).
80

Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 1993) (involving a challenge on Second Amendment grounds of a
city ordinance prohibiting the possession and sale of assault weapons, holding that the ordinance was a reasonable
exercise of police power and did not violate the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution). In Arnold, the Court
established that there was no prohibition upon a state’s granting individuals or groups greater or broader protection
than that afforded under the federal Constitution. Id. at 169. But see Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr, The New
Judicial Federalism and the Ohio Supreme Court: Anatomy of a Failure, 45 OHIO ST . L.J. 143 (1984) (observing
that the Ohio Supreme Court, at that time, had been reluctant to use the Ohio Constitution to extend greater
protection to the rights and civil liberties of Ohio citizens).
81

To make a strong statement of the independence of a state constitution, the Ohio Supreme Court relied upon two
U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Arnold, 616 N.E.2d. at 168. First, the Arnold Court cited City of Mesquite v.
Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., where the U.S. Supreme Court held that:
[a] state court is entirely free to read its own State’s constitution more broadly than [the U.S.
Supreme ] Court reads the Federal Constitution, or to reject the mode of analysis use by [the U.S.
Supreme ] Court reads the Federal Constitution, or to reject the model of analysis used by [the U.S.
Supreme ] Court in favor of a different analysis of its corresponding constitutional guarantee.
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Constitution provided a “floor [of protection] below which state court decisions may not fall.”82
In Simmons-Harris v. Goff,83 the Court expressed its conviction that, where state constitutional
language varies from the federal constitutional language, the state Constitution need not be read
as co-extensive with the federal Constitution. 84 Even where language might be looked at “in
tandem,” the Ohio Supreme Court “reserve [s] the right to adopt a different constitutional
standard” relevant to the Ohio Constitution.

85

Where a state court relies upon its own

Constitution, the court preserves the integrity of our system of federalism, and recognizes that
Id. (quoting City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982)). Second, the Arnold Court relied
on language in Michigan v. Long, in which the U.S. Supreme Court declared that interpretations of state
constitutions are to be accepted as final, as long as the state court states plainly that the decision is based upon
independent and adequate state grounds. Id. (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983)).
82

Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 169 (“As long as state courts provide at least as much protection as the U.S. Supreme Court
has provided in its interpretation of the federal Bill of Rights, state courts are unrestricted in according greater civil
liberties and protections to individuals and groups.”).
83

Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999). Simmons-Harris addressed Establishment Clause issues
dealing with school vouchers; however, to reach that issue, the Ohio Supreme Court had to determine first whether
the Ohio Constitution would control. Id. at 211-12. The Court in Simmons-Harris applied a federal analysis to the
case, as outlined in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E. 2d at 208. However, the
Court went out of its way to state emphatically that it did not follow Lemon because that is the federal test. Id. at
211. The Court declared that, “[t]oday we [adopt] the elements of the . . . Lemon test. We do this not because it is
the federal constitutional standard, but rather because the elements of the Lemon test are a logical and reasonable
method . . . .” Id. The Court thus preserved the Ohio Constitution as the source of its authority, independent of the
federal Constitution, stating that “ we now analyze pursuant to the Ohio Constitution . . . .” Id. at 212.
84

See generally Tracey Levy, Rediscovering Rights: State Courts Reconsider the Free Exercise Clause of Their
Own Constitutions in the Wake of Employment Division v. Smith, 67 TEMP . L. RE V. 1017, 1032-45 (1994)
(containing an extensive discussion of the common types of analysis employed in cases involving the need to
determine whether to employ both state and federal constitutions where language is either similar or dissimilar).
There are essentially four basic approaches to harmonizing state and federal constitutional language. Id. 1032. The
first is lockstep, where a state allows the U.S. Supreme Court to define the scope of federal free exercise claims as
well as claims brought under the state’s constitution. Id. at 1032-35. The second is interstitial, where the state will
first look to the federal Constitution, and then will analyze whether the state Constitution offers ameans to, or
warrants, the supplementing of the federal rights. Id. at 1035-37. The third approach is dual reliance, where free
exercise claims are analyzed under both the federal and state constitutions. Id. at 1040. The fourth approach is one
of primacy reliance, in which a state relies essentially upon the authority of the state constitution, independent of the
federal Constitution. Id. at 1044-45.
85

Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 212. The full text as cited in the Humphrey opinion is a powerful statement of the
Ohio Supreme Court’s analysis of the independent force of the Ohio Constitution: “The language in the Ohio
[Religion Clause] provisions is quite different from the federal language . . . . We reserve the right to adopt a
different constitutional standard pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, whether because the federal constitutional
standard changes or for any other relevant reason.” Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1045 (quoting Simmons-Harris, 711
N.E. 2d at 211-12).
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individual liberties are not protected solely by the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. 86
The Ohio Supreme Court in Humphrey thus demonstrated that the language of the Ohio
Constitution is distinct 87 and independent from that of the federal Constitution. 88 In its ultimate
holding, the Ohio Supreme Court established an unmistakable standard for Ohio free exercise
jurisprudence:
[T]he Ohio Constitution’s free exercise protection is broader, and we therefore
vary from the federal test for religiously neutral, evenly applied government
actions. We apply a different standard long held in Ohio regarding free exercise
claims – that the state enactment must serve a compelling state interest and must
be the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. That applies to direct and
indirect encroachments upon religious freedom.89
2. The Clash Between Ohio Precedent and Smith90
In Humphrey, 91 the Ohio Supreme Court held that, under Ohio precedent, there is a strict
scrutiny standard of review for free exercise of religion claims.92 Such a standard of review
86

See Glen V. Salyer, Free Exercise in Illinois: Does the State Constitution Envision Constitutionally Compelled
Religious Exemptions?, 19 N. ILL. U. L. RE V. 197 (1998) (analyzing the potential effects of construing the Illinois
constitution as granting broader religious freedom). According to the language of the Illinois Constitution, religious
freedom is “absolutely guaranteed,” save for conduct that endangers peace and safety. Id. at 218-19. There is a
significant need to rely on the state’s constitutional language so that “religious minorities are not subject to the
whims of the often oblivious majority.” Id. at 219.
87

See supra notes 80-85 and cases cited therein.

88

See Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith
Jurisprudence, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 275 (1993) (observing that a return to a pre-Smith analysis is suggested because
of a unique aspect of state constitutional language, which is the common use of explic itly religious language). In the
preambles to 45 state constitutions, there are references to a higher authority, usually by use of “God.” Id . at 284.
The article notes that this use of acknowledgment of an authority prior to the state and to the state law, indicates that
religious exemptions have a unique position in state law. Id. The author states that “[w]hen . . . rights to religious
exercise are not derived from the state but exist prior to it, religious exemptions in the absence of overriding state
interests makes sense.” Id.
89

Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1045 (emphasis added). The language “direct and indirect encroachments” recalls the
unique and broad language in the Ohio Constitution that provides that no “interference with the rights of conscience
[shall] be permitted.” OHIO CONST . art. I, § 7.
90

Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

- 17 -

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2001

17

Akron Law Review, Vol. 34 [2001], Iss. 4, Art. 4

involves a generally applicable, religion- neutral state regulation, and a determination of whether
there is a compelling state interest and if there is, whether that interest is accomplished by the
least restrictive means. 93
The standard of review announced in Smith94 eschews the least-restrictive- means element
of strict scrutiny, and instead states that the free exercise right does not relieve individuals of the
duty “to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’ ”95

91

Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1043. Ohio’s precedent in regard to analyzing freedom of religion claims appears to be
historically more stable than current federal free exercise jurisprudence. See, e.g., Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St.
387, 388-89 (1853) (considering whether a contract made on a Sunday was valid, and holding that the making of a
contract on a Sunday did not interfere with the rights of conscience as it pertained to the observance of the Sabbath).
Bloom is relevant because the opinion includes an analysis of the exact language of the Ohio Constitution used by
the Court in Humphrey. Id. at 390. The Bloom Court observed, in regard to religious tolerance:
It is not by mere toleration that every individual here is protected in his belief or disbelief. He
reposes not upon the leniency of government, or the liberality of any class or sect of men, but
upon his natural and indefeasible rights of conscience, which in the language of the [Ohio]
Constitution, are beyond the control or interference of any human authority.
Id. at 390-91.
92

See In re Milton, 505 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio 1987) (affirming an individual’s right to refuse medical treatment on
religious grounds); State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio 1976) (granting exception to Amish children in regard
to compulsory school attendance laws); Bacher v. North Ridgeville, 352 N.E.2d 627 (Ohio App. 1975) (allowing a
Jehovah’s Witness to retain the right not to raise the flag for religious reasons).
93

Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1043.

94

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Smith, held that the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit the enforcement of
generally applicable laws that were religion neutral. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 879-80 (1990). The Court was severely fragmented in this decision. Id. at 873. Justice Scalia wrote
the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy. Id. at 873-891.
Justice O’Connor wrote an extensive opinion concurring in judgment only, joined in part by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun, who did not concur in the judgment. Id. at 891-907. Justice Blackmun wrote a dissent,
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id. at 907-921. But see Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and
Religious Liberty, 40 CATH. LAW . 25 (2000). There is skepticism about the durability of Smith, not only because of
the split in the opinion itself, but also because the Court has split in the following ways in recent related decisions:
five-four on federalism; four-two-three on funding religious schools; six-three on school prayer; four-three, with two
undeclared, on free exercise. Id. at 57.
95

Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (holding that an Amish
employer must collect and pay Social Security taxes, even though his beliefs prohibited participation in government
support programs)). The majority cited Lee to support its analysis in Smith as an example of a then-recent decision
of the Court that involved compelling an individual to comply with a religion neutral, generally applicable law, even
where that law compelled activity forbidden by the individual’s religion. Id. at 880.
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Under Smith, the ODRC would need only show that the Grooming Policy was religionneutral and generally applicable, and therefore the ODRC would not have to show a compelling
state interest. 96 The Ohio Supreme Court agreed with both lower courts in finding that there was
a compelling state interest in requiring that male prison employees present a uniform
appearance. 97 In this case, however, the ODRC, while in furtherance of a compelling state
interest, did not employ the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. 98 In the alternative,
ODRC attempted to use the decision in Blanken v Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Corrections.99 The Ohio Supreme Court distinguished the two cases because of the extreme
facts in Blanken.100 The ODRC further argued that the adoption of the Smith standard was
necessary because the number of accommodations would become so numerous as to undermine
the safety of the prison system. 101 This did not happen. 102

96

See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.

97

ODRC Director Reginald Wilkinson gave testimony regarding the Grooming Policy, stating that such policy is
“essential to the esprit de corps, image, discipline and security at these [prisons]. The purpose of the policy is to
create a unified appearance among uniformed personnel . . . essential to [project] an image of monolithic, indivisible
authority to inmates . . . .” Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1045. Courts have granted prison authorities “wide-ranging
deference” in regard to policies needed to maintain order in dangerous settings. Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 547 (1979)).
98

The Ohio Supreme Court determined that the trial court must determine whether the least restrictive means was
used. Id. at 1046. The trial court found that, when Humphrey had his hair tucked under his cap, he presented a
“professional and dignified image” and that it was “impossible to tell that his hair is longer than one or two inches
when worn in this fashion.” Id.
99

Blanken v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 944 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (using the compelling state
interest test and determining that the employee, who wore an extreme hair style that was impossible to conceal, was
required to cut his hair).
100

Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1046. The Court, in fact, used Blanken as an example of where the compelling-stateinterest test would cause a citizen to comply with a state regulation that would interfere with his or her religious
beliefs because there were no less restrictive means of doing so. Id.
101

The ODRC contended that refusing to grant any exemptions from the Grooming Policy would avoid “the need of
ODRC officials to engage in a case-by-case analysis of which employees would be entitled to exemption.”
Humphrey v. Lane, No. 98 CA 4, 1998 WL 880592, at *16 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1998).
102

In 1992, the first year the Grooming Policy was implemented, ODRC employed 10,000 to 12,000 personnel.
Humphrey, 722 N.E. 2d at 1047. Employees desiring accommodation in regard to hair length were required to
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The relevant criteria under the Smith standard are whether the regulation at issue is
religion-neutral and generally applicable. 103 If these criteria are fulfilled, then the regulation
does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 104
Prior to Smith, Ohio Supreme Court free exercise decisions mirrored federal
jurisprudence because both systems followed the compelling-state- interest test. 105 The majority
in Humphrey viewed Smith as diverging from Ohio precedent. 106
In the end, the Ohio Supreme Court resolved this clash by declaring that “we have made
it clear that this court is not bound by federal court interpretations of the federal Constitution in
interpreting our own constitution . . . . The language in the Ohio provisions is quite different . . .
. We reserve the right to adopt a different standard.”107 Other states may follow Ohio’s lead. 108

submit affidavits in support of their request for exemption. Id. In 1992, only 16 employees requested such an
accommodation. Id. Such numbers do not support the dissent’s claim that not accepting Smith in this case would
lead to anarchy. Id. at 1048. Recall that Wendall Humphrey, as the result of an accommodation with ODRC, had
worn his hair under his cap without incident since the inception of the Grooming Policy. Id. at 1042.
103

Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 880-887 (1990).

104

The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Smith decision “made it clear that earlier federal jurisprudence on free
exercise claims should not be relied on . . . .” Humphrey, 722 N.E. 2d at 1044. The previous federal jurisprudence
had been the compelling-state-interest, strict scrutiny test, noted in Whisner as being “a finding ‘that there is a state
interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interests claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.’ ”
Whisner, 351 N.E.2d at 771 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972)). According to Whisner, the
state must demonstrate that such interests cannot otherwise be served in order to overbalance legitimate claims to
the free exercise of religion. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215, and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 407 (1963)).
105

See supra notes 40-41 describing the pre-Smith decision in In re Milton, 505 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio 1987), in which
the Ohio Supreme Court found that there was a convergence of state and federal free exercise jurisprudence because
both employed a strict scrutiny analysis for claims of interference with the free exercise of religion.
106

The majority chose to characterize Smith as having created a divergence. Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039,
1044 (Ohio 2000). “Divergence” signifies “a drawing apart (as of lines extending from a common center).
W EBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT ’L DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 662 (1986). In contrast, the dissent characterized the
majority opinion as a “departure” from Smith. Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1047 (Cook, J., dissenting). The term
“departure” refers to “a beginning of a new course of thought or action.” W EBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT ’L
DICTIONARY , UNABRIDGED 604 (1986).
107

Humphrey, 728 N.E. 2d at 1044. In its earlier decision in Arnold, the Ohio Supreme Court revealed the strength
of its conviction on the issue of the independent authority of the state Constitution by citing pointed language by the
Texas Supreme Court in Davenport v. Garcia: “[w]hen a state court interprets the constitution of its state merely as
a restatement of the Federal Constitution, it both insults the dignity of the state character and denies citizens of the
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B. The Dissent Argues for Goliath
The dissent expresses two basic concerns. 109 First, it is not the place of a court to
measure the particular religious beliefs of each plaintiff. 110 Second, Humphrey could impair the
state’s ability to enforce universally applicable rules. 111 The dissent, however, makes significant
concessions to the majority. 112 The most significant of these concessions is that the dissent
acknowledges that following Smith could “disadvantage religious minorities whose belief
systems are inadvertently offended by generally applicable laws.”113

state charter and denies citizens the fullest protection of their rights.” Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163,
169 (1993) (quoting Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 12 (Tex. 1992)).
108

So Chun, A Decade After Smith: An Examination of the New York Court of Appeals’ Stance on the Free
Exercise of Religion in Relation to Minnesota, Washington, and California, 63 A LB. L. REV. 1305 (2000) (exploring
how other states have sought to circumvent Smith). The New York Court of Appeals, in its free exercise decisions,
“appears oblivious” to its own state Constitution in regard to the free exercise of religion. Id. at 1305. A disturbing
implication of such a failing is that state constitutions are “inferior documents,” incapable of resolving constitutional
dilemmas, even when the claims are state-based. Id. at 1311.
109

Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1048.

110

The dissent disregards the majority’s finding that the sincerity of belief is a finding of fact to be determined not
by a test of a religion, but by a trial court. Id. at 1045-46.
111

Johnson, supra note 4. If forced to cut his hair, Humphrey planned to hold a ceremony “surrounded by family
and friends as well as the sacred sweat lodge and altar of his religion . . . . [and] plans to donate the locks for a wig
for a cancer survivor.” Id. The dissent presumes that, if they are not afforded accommodation by the state, every
citizen in every circumstance would chose to break the law. Id. This is not so with Wendall Humphrey.
112

The dissent concurs that the Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force. Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at
1047. The dissent is accustomed to strict scrutiny in application to free speech and racial discrimination. Id. at
1048. The dissent even goes so far as to acknowledge that strict scrutiny shields those who suffer from the effects of
generally applicable laws. Id. (citing Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 at
903 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment only)).
113

Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1049 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 890). The original text in Smith appears to be a very
candid observation that Smith “will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in . . . .” Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). See
also Luralene D. Tapahe, After the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Still No Equal Protection for First
American Worshippers, 24 N.M. L. REV. 331 (1994) (discussing the disparate treatment of Native Americans both
pre-Smith and post-RFRA). Religious freedom is the crowning feature and basis of American society. Id. at 331.
However, in general, the court system has not offered protection for the free exercise of Native American Indian
worshippers. Id. at 336. See also John Gatliff, City of Boerne v. Flores Wrecks RFRA: Searching for Nuggets
Among the Rubble, 23 A M. INDIAN L. REV. 285 (1998/1999) (describing Smith, RFRA, and City of Boerne, as well
as City of Boerne’s unintended effects on Indian Free Exercise). Both Smith and Humphrey involved state
infringement on Native Americans’ free exercise of their religion, a profound irony if the founding purpose of the
United States is not to be overlooked.
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The dissent states that the majority chose the system “expressly rejected in Smith.”114
The majority itself expressly held, rather, that it chose the Ohio Constitution. 115 The phrase
“religion-neutral” is curiously absent from the dissent’s reasoning. 116 The dissent found that the
compelling state interest outweighed Humphrey’s free exercise right, providing an analysis,
which, if adopted, could have an unintended effect that would marginalize religious
viewpoints, 117 and in the process interfere with Ohio citizens’ “natural and indefeasible right to
worship Almighty God . . . .”118

114

Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1049. The term “expressly” is subject to interpretation, with Smith being one the most
fragmented U.S. Supreme Court decisions in that Court’s history. See Laycock, supra note 94, at 57. On freedom
of religion issues, the U.S. Supreme Court is clearly divided, and that there are “deep ambiguities in the present
doctrine.” Id.
115

Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d. at 1040 (citing the syllabus). See also Larry Witham, Ohio Court Overrides U.S.
Constitution: State Charter Protects Indian’s Long Hair, W ASH. T IMES, May 29, 2000, at A-5 (reporting reactions
to the decisions and observations regarding future effects of state constitutions affording broader free exercise
protection).
116

Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1045-49. The phrase “religion neutral” is usually used in tandem with “compelling
state interest,” and is used as such in the majority opinion. Id. at 1045. The dissent’s view suffers from the same
defect observed in Smith, that of empowering courts to prefer the interests of the regulatory state over the interests of
the individual, thus placing the individual in the position of having to stand against the state. Frederick Mark
Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671, 693 (1992) (addressing the negative attitudes
prevalent towards religion in public life, often the result of a desire to be neutral even though, very often, the
motivation – or results – of such neutrality translates into significant interference with religious practice). But see
Mark Tushnet, The Underside of Mandatory Accommodations of Religion, 26 CAP . U. L. REV. 1 (1997). Professor
Tushnet states that “the law of accommodation presents itself as a benign law, serving to soften the edges of a rigid
majoritarianism or bureaucratic system . . . yet . . . each expansion occurs in conjunction with the creation of
[another group wanting accommodation] who is not protected.” Id. at 6.
117

Gedicks, supra note 116, at 672. “[M]any who value the contributions of religion to American life have
contended that American politics and public life are hostile to religion.” Id. at 671.
118

OHIO CONST . art. I, § 7. The dissent characterizes strict scrutiny as a weapon to be used against the state, stating
that such an analysis as the most “exacting . . . in our judicial arsenal.” Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1047. In contrast,
the majority characterized strict scrutiny as a defense for state infringement upon citizens in regard to their “rights of
conscience.” Id. at 1044.
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C. David Defeats Goliath: The Ohio Test is Born
Humphrey was heralded as the first decision of its kind. 119 The Ohio test, 120 born in
Humphrey, may appear as nothing more than a strict scrutiny analysis for claims involving the
infringement of religious free exercise. 121 The Ohio test consists of four elements: (1.) whether
the claimant hold a sincere religious belief; (2.) whether the claimant’s free exercise of religion is
infringed; (3.) whether the state has a compelling interest; and (4.) whether the state is using the
least restrictive means necessary. 122 Those who pass this test, such as Wendall Humphrey, are
free to continue to practice their religion. 123

119

Witham, supra note 115, at A-5. Patrick Korten, of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, stated that “[f]or the
first time since the 1990 ruling [in Smith] we are seeing a contrary decision at the highest state level.” Id. The
Becket Fund submitted an amicus curiae brief in Humphrey. Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1043. Roman Storzer, the
attorney who wrote the amicus brief places Humphrey in historical context:
Prior to 1990, when the government restricted the exercise of sincerely held religious beliefs, it
generally needed to justify its actions by showing that it had a compelling interest and that the
means employed were the least restrictive ones. But in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), the
Supreme Court decided that the United States Constitution provides no protection for the exercise
of religious faith if it was in conflict with neutral and generally applicable laws. When Congress
attempted to remedy this situation by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993, the
United States Supreme Court struck it down in City of Boerne v. Flores (1997). The Ohio
Supreme court has stepped into the breach and upheld the fundamental religious liberties of its
citizens. We hope many other states soon follow.
Ohio Law Protects Religious Liberty More Than the U.S., The Becket Fund News Releases (vis ited Feb. 1, 2001) <
http://www.becketfund. org>.
120

Henley v. City of Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 735 N.E.2d 433, 442-43 (Ohio 2000) (Lundberg-Stratton,
J., dissenting) (upholding an accessory use permit granted by the city board of zoning appeals to St. Brendan’s
Church in order to provide transitional housing for homeless women and children in a former convent on church
property). Henley is the first Ohio Supreme Court case to cite Humphrey. Id. at 443. Justice Lundberg-Stratton,
who wrote the dissent in Henley, characterized the strict scrutiny analysis used in Humphrey as “the Ohio test.” Id.
121

The majority expressly stated its use of a strict scrutiny analysis. Humphrey, 728 N.E. 2d at 1044-45. The
dissent expressly criticized the use of such an analysis in contradiction of Smith. Id. at 1047-49 (Cook, J.,
dissenting).
“[T]he Ohio Constitution’s free exercise protection is broader [than the federal free exercise protection], and we
therefore vary from the federal test . . . .” Id. at 1045.
122

123

“[T]he Ohio Constitution allows no law that even interferes with the rights of conscience.” Id. at 1044. The
Court concluded that “[f]orcing Humphrey to cut his hair would certainly infringe upon the free exercise of his
religion.” Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1045.

- 23 -

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2001

23

Akron Law Review, Vol. 34 [2001], Iss. 4, Art. 4

The Ohio test is distinguishable because it derives its power solely from the Ohio
Constitution and Ohio Supreme Court precedent, independent of federal law. 124 Thus, the Court
laid the foundation with the independence of the Ohio Constitution, an approach affirmed in
Arnold125 and Simmons-Harris. 126 Next, the Court added walls of stone with Whisner. 127 Lastly,
as a roof overhead to keep out the rain of interference with the rights of conscience, the Ohio
Supreme Court completed this legal structure with Humphrey. 128
Sanctuary129 is an ancient term that refers not only to a structure for religious worship,
but also to concepts of freedom and protection. Into the sanctuary of the Ohio test, individuals
may enter and find protection for their freedom to exercise their sincerely held religious beliefs.
V. CONCLUSION
I owe it all to the Creator.130
In Humphrey, the Ohio Supreme Court took a courageous step in preserving religious
freedom in the United States. 131 The Ohio test preserves for Ohio’s citizens a greater measure of

124

See supra Part II.B.1. and accompanying text.

125

Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 164 (Ohio 1993) (establishing that the Ohio Constitution is a
document of independent force).
126

Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 211-12 (Ohio 1999) (reserving the right to interpret the Ohio
Constitution independently from federal determinations).
127

State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750, 771 (Ohio 1976) (determining that the compelling interest test would be
followed in Ohio).
128

Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1040, 1043 (declaring that the language of Section Seven, Article One of the Ohio
Constitution provides that the strict scrutiny analysis is the law of Ohio’s religious free exercise jurisprudence).
129

W EBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT ’L DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 2000 (1986). “Sanctuary” is defined as a sacred place
to be held inviolable, a place of refuge and protection, a place of resort for those who seek relief. Id.
130

Johnson, supra note 9, at D-1. Cathy, Humphrey’s wife, upon hearing the news that the Ohio Supreme Court had
held in Humphrey’s favor, shouted: “There’ll be no barbers here!” Id. Humphrey responded, “I owe it all to the
Creator.” Id. See supra notes 4, 9 and accompanying text.
131

See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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freedom to exercise their religion than that given by the federal Constitution. 132 Ohio religious
free exercise precedent, of which Humphrey is the most recent affirmation, 133 preserves the strict
scrutiny, compelling-state- interest/least-restrictive- means analysis in the face of the religionneutral/generally applicable standard set forth in Smith.134
Wendall Humphrey walks “the red road” and his hair grows freely. 135 The shield of the
Ohio test 136 is raised to defend an individual’s right of conscience and to preserve a strict
scrutiny standard of review for cases involving interference with the free exercise of religion. 137
The Goliath of Smith138 has been slain by the David of the Ohio Constitution. 139
Jeffery D. Williams

132

See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.

133

See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999); In re Milton, 505 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio 1987); State v.
Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio 1976).
134

See supra Part IV.A.

135

Alan, supra note 50 at A-1 and accompanying text, recounting the development of Humphrey Humphrey’s
practice of religion.
136

See supra Part IV.C.

137

See supra Part IV.A.2.

138

The majority in Smith acknowledged that the decision would “place at a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in . . . .” Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
139

“All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
conscience.” OHIO CONST . art. 1, § 7.
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